Resilience to specified kinds of disasters is an active area of research and practice. However, rare or unprecedented disturbances that are unusually intense or extensive require a more broad-spectrum type of resilience.

So far Africa has benefited little from climate finance as compared to other continents with emerging economies. Climate projects are distributed unevenly across regions as well as among developing countries. This is partly due to lack of trained manpower in some of these countries and too restrictive criteria of most of the climate fund projects and programs that are designed to the disadvantage of Africa.

International and domestic efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions require a coordinated effort from heterogeneous actors. This experiment uses a public good game with a climate change framing to consider whether cooperation is possible in just such a climate change context.

Climate change represents a serious threat to the economic growth potential in low income countries. Instead of investing in growth, they may be drawn into strife and conflict. Climate change and the global politics to deal with it, could however also present a number of interesting opportunities for developing countries.

We analyze the interaction between a reliable source of electricity production and intermittentsources such as wind or solar power. We first characterize the optimal energy mix, emphasizing the availability of the intermittentsource as a major parameter for the optimal investment in capacity.

This Brief presents a framework that can be used to assess the potential impact of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) schemes.

Factors that determines the impact of PES are discussed such as additional forest conservation through targeted payments and the risk for unintended incentives and consequences and feelings of injustice among those who don´t receive payments. The brief further discuss the role for PES in national REDD+ policy.

What are the impacts of climate change on the Ethiopian economy?

Agriculture in Ethiopia is heavily dependent on rain. In addition to its low adaptive capacity, its geographical location and topography make the country highly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change. Results indicate that, over a 50-year period, the projected reduction in agricultural productivity may lead to 30 percent less average income, compared with the possible outcome in the absence of climate change.

How does uncertainty about “dangerous” climate change affect the prospects for international cooperation? Climate negotiations usually are depicted as a prisoners’ dilemma game; collectively, countries are better off reducing their emissions, but self-interest impels them to keep on emitting. We provide experimental evidence, grounded in an analytical framework, showing that the fear of crossing a dangerous threshold can turn climate negotiations into a coordination game, making collective action to avoid a dangerous threshold virtually assured.

We argue for integrating the consideration of location in policy planning in three ways, in order to help to predict policy impacts on deforestation and, thereby, improve policy choices.