The shrimp industry plays a leading role in aquaculture development in Vietnam. Currently, the government is running a credit subsidy program to support farmers investing in improved production methods. This paper aimed to investigate white-legged shrimp farmers’ willingness to invest in improved production methods and to examine whether the current government policy for the sector is in line with farmers’ preferences using a discrete choice experiment.

Product labelling with eco-certifications is market-based incentive tool for sustainable aquaculture, thus mitigating negative environmental impacts. The aims of this study are to investigate: i) whether consumers prefer eco-labelled (eco-certified) shrimps over conventional (non-certified) shrimp; and ii) whether consumers prefer specific eco-label (eco-certification logo) over others. The study used a discrete choice experiment method and the structured interviews with 353 consumers in Khanh Hoa province and Ho Chi Minh city, Vietnam.

Abstract

Adapting to new climate conditions will require an intricate mix of knowledge, planning, coordination, and foresight. There is increasing sectoral evidence on the implementation of successful adaptation actions. However, the success of these actions when we consider the interdependencies among sectors remains debatable. This paper aims to assess who benefits from implementing adaptation options in a multiuser river basin to both climate-induced and demographic stress on water use.

Since the public assessment of political leadership is more evident during crisis events, natural disasters have become a plausible explanation for electoral outcomes and public support. This imposes a prominent challenge for developing countries, which are less prepared to deal with catastrophes. This paper proposes a theoretical and an empirical approach to evaluate the unrestricted and conditional impact of natural disasters on the continuity of local authorities.

Using experiments in which participants play the role of polluting firms, we study compliance behavior with emissions limits under two types of fines and two different regulatory instruments. We find that the market price of pollution permits and the probability of violating permits holdings are higher with a fine that is convex in the level of violation than with one that is linear. This effect operates through an increase in the prices asked by sellers, not in the bids made by the buyers of permits.