Abstract 

We present the results of framed field (lab-in-field) experiments designed to investigate the endogenous formation of common pool resource (CPR) coalitions when the resource is co-defended with costly monitoring by coalition members and sanctions for encroachment imposed by the government. The experiments were conducted with fishers who were members of Chile's territorial use rights fisheries (TURFs) and in the lab with Chilean university students. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the fishers frequently formed CPR coalitions, even when they could not deter outsider poaching.

We study how the allocation of power in a voting procedure affects the regulation and extraction of environmental public goods. In an appropriation game experiment, different endowments induce heterogeneous preferences among the three group members regarding their preferred quota, aimed at increasing social efficiency by restricting aggregate extraction. The players vote by submitting a proposal; one among the submitted proposals is implemented, selected at random, but across treatments, we vary the odds that a type sets the regulation.