The Car Guards of Cape Town: A Public Good Analysis
This paper analyses the development and economic functioning of the car guards industry with the understanding that the market exhibits quasipublic good characteristics.
This paper analyses the development and economic functioning of the car guards industry with the understanding that the market exhibits quasipublic good characteristics.
There is growing interest in understanding whether behavior is the same across locations. By holding cross- and within-country dimensions constant (in contrast to previous studies on cross-group comparisons of conditional cooperation), the authors investigated cooperative behavior between social groups in the same location. Their results reveal significantly different cooperation behavior, suggesting that different social groups exhibit differences both in terms of composition of types and extent of conditional cooperation.
Trust is measured using both survey questions and a trust experiment among a random sample of Muslim and Hindu household heads in rural Bangladesh.
The calibration theorem by Rabin (2000) implies that seemingly plausible smallstake choices under risk imply implausible large-stake risk aversion. This theorem is derived based on the expected utility of wealth model. However, Cox and Sadiraj (2006) show that such implications do not follow from the expected utility of income model. One may then wonder about the implications for more applied consumption analysis.
This paper concerns optimal income taxation under asymmetric information in a two-type overlapping generations model, where people care about their relative consumption compared to others.
The purposes of placing sensors in water distribution systems vary from complying with water quality regulations, monitoring accidental contamination events, and detecting intentional contamination events.
This paper analyses differences in the choice of health care facility by ill individuals in HIV/AIDS-affected households in the Free State province of South Africa.
This thesis consists of six papers, related to artifactual field experiments, conducted in South Africa. The main focus of the thesis is the effect of different forms of heterogeneity on cooperation and punishment within groups.
We conduct public goods experiments where the first study draws on a sample of nine fishing communities in South Africa; the second is conducted in Cape Town amongst four high schools with distinctly different socio-economic profiles.
The ‘‘old” familiar diseases of cholera and typhoid remain a serious health threat in many developing countries. Health policy analysts often argue that vaccination against cholera and typhoid should be provided free because poor people cannot afford to pay for such vaccines and because vaccination confers positive economic externalities on unvaccinated individuals.
This paper analyses the role of risk and rate of time preference in the choice of land contracts.