The EfD Chilean Center, Research Nucleus in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics at the University of Concepción, organized for the fourth time, a discussion workshop on the design of public…
Center director Francisco Alpízar and Chairman of the Board of the association “Forever Costa Rica” released an opinion article titled: “The sharks, the finning and the public interest”. On March 2015…
We will to conduct a large study about different interest groups´ preferences for improving situation for coastal cod stocks in Western Sweden. The different interest groups included in our study are
The Competition Commission has urged the South African government to revisit the fishing rights allocation process in a way that will counter what it perceives as entrenched anti-competitive behaviour…
We examine the welfare implications of the Tanzanian fisheries boom resulting from Lake Victoria Nile perch exports during 1993–2008. In the literature, there are two opposing views on the effect of fish trade: some argue that fish trade can act as an engine of growth, while others contend that trade in fish negatively affects food security, local economies and incomes of the poor.
We study the effects of different tax schemes used in fisheries management in combination with an individual transferable quota system. We focus on the effects of taxes on equilibrium quota prices and on violations under the assumption that enforcement to induce compliance is imperfect and costly.
Objectives of tradable permit programs are often broader than internalizing an externality and improving economic efficiency. Many programs are designed to accommodate community, cultural, and other non-efficiency goals through restrictions on trading. However, restrictions can decrease economic efficiency gains. We use a policy experiment from the Alaska halibut and sablefish tradable permit program, which includes both restricted and unrestricted permits, to develop one of the few empirical measurements of the costs of meeting non-efficiency goals.
This paper studies the effects of different tax schemes used in fishery management in combination with an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system. It focuses on the effects of taxes on equilibrium quota prices and violations under the assumption that enforcement to induce compliance is imperfect and costly. The use of taxes is motivated by the regulator’s need to recover costs for enforcement activities.
We develop a decision making model based on constraints that are typically encountered in fisheries management when setting the total allowable quota. The model allows us to assess the differences in outcomes when the decision is made by different management institutions under uncertain conditions.
This article presents a decision-making model based on situations that are typically encountered in fisheries management when setting the total allowable quota. The model allows assessing the differences in outcomes when different management institutions make the decision under uncertain conditions. Social preferences are considered to measure the social expected costs raised by different institutions.