China and the United States are the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, making them pivotal players in global climate negotiations. Within the coming decade, however, India is set to become the most important counterpart to the United States, as it overtakes China as the country with the most at stake depending on the type of global burden-sharing agreements reached, thus becoming a member of the ‘Climate G2’. We create a hypothetical global carbon market based on modelling emissions reduction commitments across countries and regions relative to their marginal abatement costs.

Evaluating the trade-offs between the risks related to climate change, climate change mitigation as well as co-benefits requires an integrated scenarios approach to sustainable development. We outline a conceptual multi-objective framework to assess climate policies that takes into account climate impacts, mitigation costs, water and food availability, technological risks of nuclear energy and carbon capture and sequestration as well as co-benefits of reducing local air pollution and increasing energy security.

Introducing a price on greenhouse gas emissions would not only contribute to reducing the risk of dangerous anthropogenic climate change, but would also generate substantial public revenues. Some of these revenues could be used to cover investment needs for infrastructure providing access to water, sanitation, electricity, telecommunications, and transport.

Low-carbon electricity generation, i.e. renewable energy, nuclear power and carbon capture and storage, is more capital intensive than electricity generation through carbon emitting fossil fuel power stations. High capital costs, expressed as high weighted average cost of capital (WACC), thus tend to encourage the use of fossil fuels. To achieve the same degree of decarbonization, countries with high capital costs therefore need to impose a higher price on carbon emissions than countries with low capital costs.

The literature on the “resource curse” has strongly emphasized that large incomes from resource endowments may have adverse effects on the growth prospects of a country. Conceivably the income generated from emission permit allocations, as suggested in the context of international climate policy, could have a comparable impact. Effects of a “climate rent curse” have so far not been considered in the design of permit allocation schemes. In this study, we first determine when to expect a climate rent curse conceptually by analyzing its potential channels.

Although market-based environmental policy instruments feature prominently in economic theory and are widely employed, they often face public resistance. We argue that such resistance may be driven by moral responsibility, where citizens prefer to tackle the environmental problems that they have caused by themselves, rather than delegating the task to others by means of a market mechanism.