The Swedish coastal zone is a scene of conflicting interests
about various goods and services provided by nature.
Open-access conditions and the public nature of
many services increase the difficulty in resolving these
conflicts.

Global environmental problems are often assumed to imply extensive inefficiencies since there is no global authority corresponding to the government at a national level.

This paper shows, on the contrary, that rich countries in a free unregulated market may still undertake globally efficient abatement investments, given the existence of limited non-paternalistic altruism.

This paper presents an experimental study of two different pollution compliance games: collective vis-à-vis random fining as a means to regulate non-point pollution. Result suggests the importance of considering subject pool differences in the evaluation of environmental policies by means of experiments, particularly if those policies involve certain forms of management decisions.

This paper provides an overview and a discussion of environmental taxes in Europe. On the whole, most European countries have fairly high levels of environmental taxation – at least compared to the US.

Over the last two decades many airline markets have been deregulated, resulting in increased competition and use of different types of networks. At the same time there has been an intense discussion on environmental taxation of airline traffic. It is likely that an optimal environmental tax and the effects of a tax differ between different types of aviation markets.

In this paper, we address the issue of optimal environmental taxation under imperfect competition. The problem is analysed for three different types of duopoly models, the Cournot open and closed loop models, and the Stackelberg model.