Trust, Trust Games and Stated Trust: Evidence from Rural Bangladesh

Peer Reviewed
1 January 2013

Levels of trust are measured by asking standard survey questions on trust and by observing the behaviour in a trust game using a random sample in rural Bangladesh.

Follow-up questions and correlations between the sent amount in the trust game and stated expectations reveal that the amount sent in the trust game is a weak measure of trust. The fear of future punishment, either within or after this life, for not being sufficiently generous to others, was the most frequently stated motive behind the respondents’ behaviour, highlighting the potential importance of motives that cannot be inferred directly from people’s behaviour.

Publication reference
Johansson-Stenman, O., M. Mahmud and P. Martinsson (2011) Trust, trust games and stated trust: Evidence from rural Bangladesh, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.

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Publication | 24 November 2013