Marine resource projects for rural economic development policies in Chile: marine user rights and disruption costs

Abstract
Governments offer resource user rights, such as individual and collective agricultural land rights, fishing quotas, and territorial user rights in marine activities, to induce economic development and efficient resource use. Yet, user rights and improved incomes do not always lead to project uptake, as in rural-rural migration. Marine user rights may differ from land tenure rights, especially when rights are individual or collective. We explore household survey data from Chile about participation in projects linking marine resource activities with user rights across payoff levels and commute/relocation ‘disruption’ costs. Households are more likely to participate in projects with low disruption costs and high incomes, yet many households reject lucrative projects. The household's existing user rights and the project's activity–rights pairs affect project participation levels, with differences across collective and individually-held rights. These results inform policy aimed at increasing incomes and resource use efficiency through marine resource projects with user rights.