The Political Intergenerational Welfare State

Peer Reviewed
1 January 2017

Using a three-period overlapping generations economy framework, we characterize an intergenerational welfare state with endogenous education and pension under voting. We show that although politically establishing Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) social security in isolation in a dynamically efficient economy will always reduce the capital investment and therefore the social welfare as expected, in contrast politically implementing education-pension policy package instead can improve both human and physical capital accumulation and social welfare over laissez faire. However for this the political influence of the old has to be small thus limiting the size of the PAYG social security program.

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Sustainable Development Goals
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Monisankar Bishnu, Min Wang, The political intergenerational welfare state, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Volume 77, 2017, Pages 93-110, ISSN 0165-1889,

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Publication | 21 April 2017