Clara Inés Villegas Palacio
Given its characteristics, environmental quality can be considered a public good. With increasing recognition of the significance of environmental protection, a large number of policy instruments have been designed to regulate pollution in hopes to achieve the desired levels of this public good. Among these instruments are economic incentives such as environmental taxes and marketable emission permits. In several cases, the design of such a policies gives them a social dilemma character where regulated agents have a clear incentive not to cooperate by not complying with the regulation. The question I address in part of my PhD thesis is how cooperation in social dilemma situations and compliance with environmental regulations are affected by factors such as social groups’ background and the design of institutions, as well as the possibility of adopting a more efficient abatement technology.
Main research interests:
Environmental economics and policy instruments, behavioral economics and economic valuation.
Researchers
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