tanzania | Forestry

To Bribe or Not to Bribe: Incentives to Protect Tanzania´s Forest

In forests managed by participatory management in Tanzania, “volunteer” patrollers often enforce access restrictions, receiving a share of collected fine revenue as incentive. The authors explore how shared revenue and alternative sources of forest products for villagers determine the patrollers’ enforcement effort and decision to take bribes rather than report violators.

Using an optimal enforcement model, they show that without transparency or funds to pay and monitor these patrollers, policymakers face tradeoffs among efficiency, enforcement effectiveness, and revenue collection.

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  • tanzania

Type of publication

  • EfD Discussion paper

Reference

Robinson, Elizabeth J. Z. and Razack B. Lokina (2009), "To Bribe or Not to Bribe: Incentives to Ptotect Tanzania´s Forests", EfD Discussion Paper 09-17, Environment for Development Initiative and resources for the Future, Washington DC, September 2009.

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