eeu sweden tanzania | Behavior ec.

Enforcement of Exogenous Environmental Regulations, Social Disapproval, and Bribery

Many resource users are not involved in formulating and enforcement of resource management regulations in developing countries and do not generally accept such rules. Enforcement officers who have social ties to resource users may encounter social disapproval if they enforce regulations zealously, so they may accept bribes to avoid it. The authors present a neoclassical utility maximization framework that characterizes this situation, derive results for situations where officers are passively and actively involved in the bribery, and make some interesting policy recommendations.

Enforcement officers who have social ties to resource users may encounter social disapproval if they enforce regulations zealously, so they may accept bribes to avoid it. The authors present a neoclassical utility maximization framework that characterizes this situation, derive results for situations where officers are passively and actively involved in the bribery, and make some interesting policy recommendations. 

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  • eeu sweden
  • tanzania

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  • Peer reviewed

Reference

Akpalu Wisdom, Håkan Eggert, and Godwin K. Vondolia (2009), "Enforcement of Exogenous Environmental Regulation, Social Disapproval, and Bribery" Journal of Socio-Economics 38(6), pp. 940-945.

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