http://www.efdinitiative.org The EfD in Tanzania, through the promotion of policy relevant and academically rigorous research, provides economic analysis that supports national environmental management and policy to reduce poverty and promote sustainable national welfare. daily 1 2007-10-02T15:00:42Z http://www.efdinitiative.org/research/publications/publications-repository/the-poverty-demography-trap-in-third-world-countries-empirical-evidence-from-tanzania In this paper, the relation between poverty indicators and demographic variables is explored using household survey data from two regions in Northern Tanzania (the Lake Victoria area). No publisher karinbackteman Asmerom Kidane (2010), "The Poverty Demography Trap in Third World Countries Empirical Evidence from Tanzania", Efd Discussion Paper 10-08, a joint publication of the Environment for Development Initiative and Resources for the Future (www.rff.org), Washington DC. March 2010. Poverty Macro models 2010-04-27T17:14:19Z Article http://www.efdinitiative.org/research/publications/publications-repository/protecting-developing-countries-forests-enforcement-in-theory-and-practice This paper relates the key findings of the optimal economic enforcement literature to practical issues of enforcing forest and wildlife management access restrictions in developing countries. Our experiences, particularly from Tanzania and eastern India, provide detail of the key pragmatic issues facing those responsible for protecting natural resources. No publisher Salvatory Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson, Ajay Kumar Mahaputra, and Heidi J. Albers. 2010. Protecting Developing Countries' Forests: Enforcement in Theory and Practice, Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research, Volume 2 Issue 1, 25-38. Forest management Corruption Enforcement 2010-01-21T07:38:41Z Article http://www.efdinitiative.org/research/publications/publications-repository/enforcement-of-exogenous-environmental-regulations-social-disapproval-and-bribery-2 Many resource users are not involved in formulating and enforcement of resource management regulations in developing countries and do not generally accept such rules. Enforcement officers who have social ties to resource users may encounter social disapproval if they enforce regulations zealously, so they may accept bribes to avoid it. The authors present a neoclassical utility maximization framework that characterizes this situation, derive results for situations where officers are passively and actively involved in the bribery, and make some interesting policy recommendations. No publisher elampi Akpalu Wisdom, Håkan Eggert, and Godwin K. Vondolia (2009), "Enforcement of Exogenous Environmental Regulation, Social Disapproval, and Bribery" Journal of Socio-Economics 38(6), pp. 940-945. Social preferences Corruption 2010-05-14T06:47:55Z Article